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The provision of goods and services online is growing rapidly across a wide range of 
industries, including financial services. In financial services, online innovation has often focused 
on transforming the back and middle offices, assisting investment management (the front office) 
in order to realize economies of scale and/or networking effects. By contrast, now we are seeing 
the application of increased computing power, internet bandwidth, and cloud capacity to customer 
acquisition, service, education, and advice. In this vein, online financial robo-advice has garnered 
significant public attention and sizable venture capital funding based on the promise that, through 
digitization, advice offerings can deliver a quality experience to individual investors at lower cost, 
thereby disrupting the financial industry. 
While robo-advice is arguably in its early days, some lessons and continuing challenges 
are already emerging, shaped by several identifiable forces that we consider from the perspective 
of both the investor and the advice provider. This chapter takes both perspectives by reviewing the 
goals and objectives of robo-advice, the evolving business models, and available evidence on the 
demographics of robo-advice, the advice ‘models,’ and investor behavior. We conclude that, on 
the customer side, robos are being used not only by affluent Millennial investors, but also by others 
who want fast, mobile, and easy access to their finances. On the business side, early proponents 
promised to upend or disrupt the financial advice industry. Yet in practice, robo-advice is used by 
both traditional and startup providers to replace entirely traditional ‘human touch’ advice delivery 
models, but also to reach new customers and serve current ones. Moreover, providing advice is 
not enough: to be successful, firms must also sell advice-driven investments fulfilled by passive 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and mutual funds.   
For both investors and providers, the overall effect is to lower prices of individualized 
advice as well as to enable providers to offer and users to select from price and customization 
 
 
points on the advice spectrum. Consequently, advice is coming in various flavors including ‘pure’ 
robo-advice, hybrid robo-advice supplemented by a ‘human touch,’ traditional face-to-face 
advising (sometimes supplemented by online tools), and advice embodied in low-cost products 
such as target date and other allocation funds.  
It is too early to say which are strong or weak trends, and robo-advice models differ in 
terms of their underlying algorithms, the resulting advice offered, and ease of access. In rising 
markets, these differences may not be as discernable as they will be during a market downturn. 
We conclude by considering where the advice experience might be going, including what will 
happen during an industry shakeout. We also consider the potential for further evolution of 
investment offerings to include actively managed funds able to better manage market swings. 
Clearly robo-advice offers numerous promises, yet little evidence is available so far on the actual 
effects of using advice, such as changes in asset allocation and long-term effects on financial 
security.   
 
Understanding the Robo-advice Experience 
Many might think the robo-advice experience would be shaped entirely by the nature, 
quality, and presentation of information provided to investors via an automated tool. Accordingly, 
one could focus on the technical algorithms behind online advice, the details of the advice offered, 
and the look and feel of the interface. Yet in practice, the robo-experience is also powerfully shaped 
by the complexity of the financial problems that this advice is meant to address. This includes the 
prescriptiveness of the advice system, individual investor characteristics including goals, 
objectives, and behaviors, and the availability and suitability of different investment options.  In 
turn, these are structured by the goals and organizational arrangements of advice provider firms. 
 
 
As noted by Fisch et al. (2019), robo-advice tends to cover pre-tax and after-tax asset 
allocation and fund selection through time, as well as saving and spending; less often does it 
include estate and tax plans. As such, robo-advice stands at one end of a customization and 
regulatory oversight continuum. Financial education is at the other end, where firms and advisors 
provide information about the benefits of saving, investing, and asset allocation without reference 
to individuals’ circumstances (see Figure 1).   
Figure 1 here 
Customization and complexity. Guidance tends to offer clients saving targets and broad asset 
allocation recommendations, but it generally does not recommend specific securities or investment 
products. By contrast, advice goes beyond education and guidance to cover specific 
recommendations for financial products suitable for individuals. As such, advice implies that the 
advisor has gathered necessary and sufficient information about the client and evaluated it to 
determine the suitability of investment recommendations.1 Left for interpretation are the practical 
definitions of sufficient and suitable investment recommendations. 
From an investor’s perspective, the overall objective is to save, invest, and spend to meet 
his or her goals. From the advice provider’s perspective, the objective is to adequately serve the 
investor, to meet fiduciary responsibilities, and to gather and/or retain assets. While the investor’s 
and the provider’s objectives are not identical, both the investor and the provider are interested in 
efficiency, balancing the costs of information gathering, evaluation, and advice delivery against 
the benefits of potential increases in lifetime consumption.   
Theoretical research shows that when portfolio and/or financial advice is adopted early in 
consumers’ lives, the certainty-equivalent consumption generated for clients can rise by 1.1 
percent per year over the entire lifetime (Kim et al. 2016), and by 23 percent during retirement 
 
 
(Blanchett and Kaplan 2013). Although those studies do not distinguish between traditional and 
robo-advice, they are particularly applicable to robo-advice since they apply robo-like systematic 
and rules-based approaches to financial behavior. As such, robo-advisors claim to offer some or 
most of the customization a financial advisor can provide, while they do it systematically and 
precisely via software algorithms that are documentable, replicable, and repeatable, and potentially 
at lower cost. What sets robos apart is their potential through digitization, automation, and ease of 
use, to systematize advice offering and lower its cost for current investors and new consumers (see 
Figure 2).   
Figure 2 here 
Many different organizational arrangements are associated with robo-advisors. In some 
cases, stand-alone robo-advisors offer advice online. In other cases, full-service financial services 
firms use automated asset allocation advice as one of many tools to assist financial advisors in 
working one-on-one with investors to construct and manage portfolios and make other financial 
planning decisions (see Table 1). 
Table 1 here 
 
Evolution, Not Revolution 
The automated or digitized features of robo-advice did not spring forth fully-formed. Thus 
robo-advice started in 2008 with Betterment followed by Wealthfront, and in the early days the 
focus was on rebalancing across target date funds (Scott-Briggs 2016). In turn, this process was 
inspired by Mint, an online checking account aggregator, later sold to Intuit (Future Advisor 2015). 
Nevertheless, this Silicon Valley-centric view gives insufficient attention to the earlier antecedents 
of robo-advice such as Mpower and Financial Engines, which were startups offering services to 
 
 
employers and their employees. For example, Financial Engines, Ibbotson, and other independent 
robo-advisors provided pre-tax asset allocation and savings advice through defined contribution 
(DC) plans, when employers sought to offer employees financial advice but were legally required 
to do so via an independent provider.   
Adoption and takeup of such advice was initially disappointing, both in terms of numbers 
of individuals and amounts of revenue. Subsequently, Ibbotson was sold to Morningstar, and both 
Financial Engines and Morningstar offered to manage the assets on which they gave advice. As of 
2018, Financial Engines had nearly one million advised and managed accounts inside employer 
plans at nearly 150 Fortune 500 firms, with a growing number of customers through the Wells 
Fargo-managed 401k platform (Toonkel and Randall 2015).   
More recently, Financial Engines moved into managed income for 401k accounts and IRA 
rollovers. This advice plus asset management business model, pre- and/or post-tax, has now 
become the industry standard, for standalone firms and financial services conglomerates. In 
addition, traditional financial firms such as Fidelity, Vanguard, and TIAA also began to offer 
online advice as a way of retaining assets and gathering more through additional services.   
 
The Robo-advice Process 
Robo-advice processes and models differ not only in terms of what they cover, but also by 
the intensity of human involvement. Many investors learn about robo-advisors via online, radio, 
or television advertising; word of mouth; an employer pension plan; or, in some cases, a financial 
advisor’s recommendation. One or more of these would prompt a visit to the robo-advisor’s 
website. Overall, the advice process involves initial awareness, assessment, modeling, results and 
 
 
recommendations and follow-up. Each of these steps may be conducted exclusively online, or via 
telephone or face-to-face interactions with a human advisor. 
Assessment.  Investment advice is often provided based on a web-based questionnaire used to 
assess the investor’s goals, financial circumstances, and personal characteristics. As with other 
aspects of robo-advice, the purpose and quality of questionnaires varies across the industry. Such 
assessments are used to gauge investors’ risk perceptions and risk tolerance, as well as risk 
capacity. These are usually summarized in a risk tolerance score or label, such as ‘conservative,’ 
‘moderately conservative,’ ‘moderate,’ ‘moderately aggressive,’ or ‘aggressive.’ At a financial 
firm where an investor already has a relationship, some financial and personal information may be 
transported over from the investor’s current accounts.   
Some question this approach to measuring risk tolerance and risk perception-related 
responses since behavioral research has shown that people often behave in what appears to be non-
rational ways. Examples in the literature include asymmetric risk aversion (prospect theory), 
anchoring, and the ‘house money’ effect (where 20% loss after a 20% gain is perceived differently 
from a 20% loss after a previous 20% loss). Additional behavioral factors include ‘dual self’ 
theory, where actual behavior differs from self-predicted behavior.   
Nevertheless, the psychology literature lends support for the use of validated 
questionnaires. For instance, questions designed to assess loss aversion and the self-assessed risk 
of previous financial decisions are believed reliable when explaining variations in peoples’ 
portfolio allocations and investment decisions (Guillemette et al. 2012). Moreover, clients’ risk 
self-assessments and validated questionnaires have been shown to better determine risk tolerance 
than financial advisors’ assessments (Roszkowski and Grable 2005; Elsayed and Martin 1998). On 
the other hand, risk questionnaires rarely are psychometrically tested for validity or reliability, and 
 
 
many use poorly constructed questions, conflate risk tolerance versus risk capacity, and cannot 
identify highly risk-averse investors (Kitces 2016). Handling poor financial literacy is also 
difficult.   
 As an alternative to assessing an individual’s risk characteristics, a different approach 
assigns risk to each of an investor’s goals so that, for example, all investors saving for college 
would have a similar risk metric which differs from the risk metric assigned to saving for 
retirement or paying rent. Different goals can also be assigned relative importance weights, as 
implemented by Veritat and WealthBench (Weinrich 2012). While this tactic requires individuals 
to identify, schedule, and rank their financial goals, it does avoid the potential pitfalls of individual 
risk tolerance assessments. 
Asset allocation and fund selection calculators. Robo-advisors employ formal models to create 
investment and savings advice, many of which share a foundation in modern portfolio theory 
(MPT). Inputs to these models include investor risk aversion, age, current assets, and other 
information along with the provider’s estimates of expected asset returns, volatilities, and 
correlations. Model capabilities range from fairly simple, offering advice on overall asset 
allocation and fund packages, to comprehensive, also recommending insurance, trusts, wills, and 
other financial planning products and services.  
Not surprisingly, robo-advisor asset allocation and fund selection models generate different 
results depending on statistical assumptions about capital market processes. Analytic approaches 
use historical returns and volatilities, estimated expected inputs, and Bayesian approaches, all of 
which generate different predictions. They also can use different measurement periods as well as 
re-estimation and historical sampling frequencies. Unlike the mutual fund industry where fund 
benchmarks are required and ubiquitous, the advice industry has not yet established standards on 
 
 
capital market assumptions, measurement periods, or ‘what to solve for.’ Additionally, models and 
inputs are rarely made public, making it impossible to compare methodologies and approaches. 
And, of course, historical evidence can mislead, as during the financial crisis when traditionally 
uncorrelated securities became highly correlated.  
Advice delivery. In practice, a variety of robo-advice delivery systems has emerged. Some 
providers, such as Acorns, enable new customers to download an app to a mobile phone, input 
basic information, get an allocation and fund selection recommendation, transfer funds from a 
personal bank account, and be up and running within 10 minutes. Others work closely with 
advisors at independent firms or financial services conglomerates; in this case, advisors specialize 
in communications including the initial conversation, advice delivery, portfolio implementation, 
and additional follow-ups. An automated system takes care of receiving investor data inputs and 
producing recommendations, which in turn are conveyed by the advisor. Some firms such as 
Vanguard offer different levels of ‘human touch’ at different price points. 
Investor receptivity. Based on industry surveys of higher net worth households (over $100,000 
in investable assets), it appears that many customers deem it important to have access to their 
portfolio information at all times (Cerulli Associates 2017). No matter what the channel (bank, 
wirehouse, financial advisor, direct investment provider, retirement plan provider) or size of assets, 
20-30 percent of those investors used online tools and calculators, and 30-55 percent viewed their 
accounts or traded via online tools. Even for those who did not currently use robo-advisors, 20-45 
percent of those under age 40 were ‘somewhat likely’ or ‘very likely’ to use a robo-advisor, with 
older and wealthier investors much less unlikely to do so.   
Interestingly, when prompted, some 80 percent of those surveyed reported not having heard 
of most robo-advice providers, the exceptions being Vanguard and Charles Schwab. Of the 13 
 
 
most prominent robo-providers, only 2-5 percent of respondents indicated that they used their 
robo-services (Cerulli Associates 2017). Those who did cited ease of use and cost as the main 
reasons for doing so. Among investors unlikely to use a digital advice provider, nearly 60 percent 
preferred human interaction to technology, and as many as 40 percent of those under age 40 said 
the same. 
Though only a small percentage of the investor population has actually adopted robo-
advice to date, it appears that Millenials and younger cohorts are more receptive than their 
predecessors. Among younger investors, robo-advice is most used by those with higher income 
and net worth, people who are online facile, and investors willing to take more risk (Cohen 2018; 
Cerulli 2017). Interestingly, investors using robo-advice did so using new assets rather than 
transferring assets away from current managers (Cerulli 2017). In other words, robo-advice at 
present is being used for incremental savings, tempering the likely growth of the sector. 
 
Investor Behavior and Impact 
 Of ultimate interest is how robo-advice will shape investors’ consumption, retirement 
incomes, and overall well-being. As noted above, theoretical studies predict improvements in 
these, but real-world evidence is sparse. Early research by Warshawsky and Ameriks (2000), 
Bodie (2003), Kotlifoff (2006), Dowd et al. (2008) and Turner (2010) evaluated the advice 
provided, and these studies found significant shortcomings. These included the fact that too little 
financial information was gathered, risk tolerance assumptions were not well-grounded, overall 
net worth was not examined, asset allocation models and advice were too simplistic, and the client 
interfaces were often confusing.  
 
 
 More recently, comparisons of robo-offerings have become popular and can be found on a 
variety of financial websites (e.g., Investor Junkie, Investopedia, Kiplinger, Motley Fool, and 
more). Still, while most compare features and ease of use, few examine results or impacts. A more 
systematic examination of advice was offered by Aon Hewitt Financial Engines (2014) which 
studied 14 large DC plans offering three types of ‘help’ or advice. The topics covered included 
target-date funds, managed accounts, and online advice based on data from 2006 to 2012. During 
that period, online or robo-advice was used by only 5.4 percent of all plan participants, compared 
to 17 percent for target date plans (TDF) and 12 percent for managed accounts, while the rest (a 
little less than 65%) were self-directed.2 Target-date fund usage was driven primarily by an 
automatic enrollment (‘opt-out’) feature in some plans, while managed account and robo-advice 
usage was entirely ‘opt-in.’ 
Regarding returns, plan participants opting for any kind of ‘help’ or advice between 2006 
and 2012 achieved over 3 percent better net annual returns compared to participants not opting for 
help. Those using a combination of TDFs and self-directed investing did better than fully self-
directed participants by about 90 bps/year, but they did significantly worse than participants 
receiving any form of help or advice (by about 2% per year). Notably, the return differences 
between participants using different types of help or advice were negligible. 
Prior research has confirmed that most influential contributor to long-term financial 
security is the individual’s contribution rate, followed by the length of the contribution period 
(Hammond and Richards 2010). Therefore, it is useful to note that the Aon Hewitt Financial 
Engines (2014) study found that online advisees had the highest contribution rates of any group, 9 
percent on average, versus 4.4 percent for TDF participants, 7.5 percent for managed account 
participants, and 6.6 percent for self-directed participants. While managed account participants 
 
 
were older than online advice users, online advice users had significantly higher average account 
balances than other plan participants.  
 Though hardly definitive, this evidence suggests that advice - including robo-advice – has 
been associated with better outcomes, at least in the short-to-medium time frame. While we cannot 
know whether advice seekers would have done better in the absence of advice than non-advice 
seekers, it is safe to conclude that advice, including robo-advice is not harmful and may be helpful. 
 In a related chapter (Fisch et al. 2019), the authors survey in some detail the nature of these 
models and the quality of the actual advice offered by robo-advisors. That study noted that, while 
an individual investor would receive the same advice with repeated visits to a single provider’s 
website, he or she could be provided with different advice from different providers due to different 
ways of assessing risk tolerance and financial circumstances, the underlying model, and the 
model’s inputs. Some models have been validated by the experience of their recommended 
portfolios through a full business cycle, while others have yet to experience a full cycle. It is also 
important to note that many studies suffer from self-selection or the tendency for people who use 
advisors (versus those who do not) to be more likely to take steps that positively affect their wealth 
and lifetime consumption, regardless of what the advisor recommends.  
Research by Marsden et al. (2011) that controlled for self-selection showed that some types 
of activities increased when working with a financial advisor (e.g., goal setting, calculating 
retirement needs, portfolio diversification), yet there were no significant effects on saving rates 
and short-term asset values. Other evidence comes from comparing advisors with brokers, as the 
latter are not required to act in clients’ best interest. In an experiment (Guillemette and Jurgensen 
2017) and also in a comparative study (Martin and Finke 2012), advice from a certified financial 
planner resulted in higher investor account balances than did broker advice. A comparative study 
 
 
by Chalmers and Reuter (2012) concluded that investment outcomes associated with broker advice 
were considerably worse than from self-directed portfolios and target date funds. Work by 
Hoeschle et al. (2017) that accounted for self-selection found that bank customers who followed 
bank advisor recommendations did worse than had they followed a broad stock benchmark. Yet 
on the whole, these studies did not focus on robo-advisors.  
 
An Ongoing Case Study 
An interesting ongoing analysis sponsored by Condor Capital (2018) is focusing on the 
effects of robo-advice by establishing both taxable and tax-deferred accounts at 20 prominent robo-
advisors, some standalone while others form part of a broader financial services firm.3 The taxable 
accounts established used an investor profile appropriate to a long-term investor with a moderate 
risk tolerance, while the tax-deferred account used the profile of a long-term investor with a high 
risk tolerance. In analyzing the findings, it is important to keep in mind that this analysis is limited 
by the short time frame (two years or fewer) and the effects of many unknown variables including 
the specific funds used to build portfolios, and when the providers changed asset allocations.  
Several outcomes from the Condor Capital report on taxable account experience are worth 
highlighting; findings and relative comparisons were roughly similar for tax-deferred accounts.  
First, robo-advisor fees vary across firms and within firms by size of assets. In some cases, they 
also differ by whether the account holder uses only the digital platform or supplements it with a 
human advisor. As seen in Table 2, robo-only taxable account fees vary from zero bps (per year) 
on the account assets, to about 90 bps, with most fees in the 25 to 30 bps range.  Minimum 
investment amounts also vary, from none to $100,000. 
Table 2 here 
 
 
Presumably, low fee and low minimum robo-offerings are cross-subsidized by investment 
management and other charges. When ‘premium’ or ‘selective’ service is offered (i.e., the ability 
to work with a human advisor), fees are 15-25 bps higher over digital-only service, for totals in 
the 40-50 bps range.  This may be compared to managed accounts, where fees are typically at least 
twice that.  Note that for many premium robo offerings, account minimums are higher as well. 
Second, we compare outcomes regarding asset allocation and fund selection. The classic 
rule-of-thumb for a medium-risk tolerant, long-term investor is a 60/40 portfolio (60% equities 
and 40% bonds, with an expected annual volatility of about 10%). In Table 3, we see that 11 of 
the 20 robo-advisor equity allocations were within 2 percentage points of the classic allocation 
(60%) for a similar investor profile.  
Table 3 here 
Overall, allocations ranged from 56 to 71 percent equity and from 22 to 41 percent fixed income, 
with between 0 and 15 percent in ‘miscellaneous’ investments and cash.  Within equities, the 
allocation to domestic equities (versus international equities) ranged from 45 to 75 percent.   
It is worth noting that many robo-advisors are active allocators and manage their portfolios 
dynamically or even tactically, both in terms of the equity/fixed income split and the domestic 
equity/international equity split. For example, while Betterment did not change its allocations 
during the last two years, TD Ameritrade raised its equity allocation from 65 to 71 percent and 
lowered its domestic equity allocation from 65 to 60 percent. For the funds in the Condor Capital 
study (2018), we see that robo-advisors generally used index funds, particularly on the equity side.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the equity allocations all showed similar large-cap blend behavior, with a 
pronounced tilt toward large-cap stocks and a slight tilt toward growth stocks. Fixed income 
holdings were more diverse across providers, with some favoring municipal bonds, treasury 
 
 
inflation protected securities (TIPS), and Treasuries, while others tilted toward emerging markets; 
still others were closer to ‘neutral.’ Nearly all of the fixed income allocations were neutral to 
negative on corporate, high-yield, and mortgage-backed securities. 
Third, we compare the investment performance for a moderately risk tolerant investor in 
Figures 3 and 4. For the seven providers with two-year results, total returns varied from 21 to 27 
percent (10 to 13% on an annualized basis). For these same providers, Sharpe Ratios were 
impressive, ranging from 1.5 (Acorns) to 2.2 (Schwab) percent. Of course, these results are 
indicative of recent robust equity markets. A better test of what robo-advisors can deliver will 
come during market downturns, as may be gleaned from a glance at the upside and downside 
capture ratios of the accounts having two-year histories. Figure 5 shows that the providers with 
better downside capture ratios (i.e., capture less of any market decline) are to the left, and those 
with better upside capture (i.e., capture more of any market increase) are higher, so providers that 
are up and to the left have better upside/downside capture ratios.   
Figures 3, 4, and 5 here  
Two providers (Vanguard and Betterment) appear right at the center, both of which had 
identical 65/35 asset allocations that did not change over the two years. Interestingly, Schwab had 
a nearly identical allocation to equities (64%), but a lower allocation to fixed income and a 
significant allocation to cash (10 to 11%), which presumably provided downside protection while 
presevering equity exposure. On the other end, while Acorns had a slightly lower equity allocation 
(62%), it had the highest allocation to domestic equities of any provider; the recent outperformance 
of international equities thus lowered returns and limited the allocation’s downside protection.  
 
 
In the years to come, the Condor Capital project will generate a longer-term view of the 
impact and characteristics of robo-advice offerings. Only then can we draw firmer conclusions 
about the long-term impact of robo-advice on investor wellbeing.   
 
Conclusions 
To date, robo-advice has been concentrated among younger and more affluent investors, 
so changes in usage may be gradual and cohort-driven. These investors seem drawn to robo-advice 
by its ease of access and usage, compared to the time, number of forms, signatures, and face-to-
face meetings required in most traditional advice and investment offerings. There is also promising 
early evidence that investors who used online advice save more and improve returns compared to 
investors who did not.   
  While robo-advice is apparently not producing a major disruption in the types of firms 
offering advice, the industry is changing. There is a proliferation of standalone robo-advice firms 
where the early firms moved from charging for advice without direct asset management, to 
charging for advice embedded along with managed accounts. Moreover, traditional investment 
firms and advisors are buying startup robo-advice firms, licensing technology, and creating new 
tiered advice models. These traditional firms are also adopting so-called ‘cyborg solutions’ – part-
human, part-computer, in the way face-to-face banking with tellers evolved to include on-line 
banking as an option). As with other services, firms are likely to use robo-advice to attract and 
retain customers attracted to its ease of use along with their assets.   
 The next big test will be a market downturn. Some standalone startups have already 
survived at least one major market shakeout (for instance, Financial Engines and others established 
 
 
before the global financial crisis). We can expect that differences in allocations and advice delivery 
will be made evident in the next shakeout. 
 Nevertheless, more remains to be learned about how robo-advice content and models, as 
well as industry organization and delivery, affect behavior. A related question is whether robo-
advice obviates the need for improved financial literacy. And crucially, although beyond the scope 
of the present chapter, legal and regulatory concerns are raised by advice generally and robo-advice 
in particular. Some of these are addressed elsewhere in this volume by Baker and Delleart (2019), 
Fisch et al. (2019), and Polansky et al. (2019). 
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Endnotes 
1 Financial education, guidance, and advice all have specific regulatory definitions. For example, 
a discussion of what financial advice covers in the UK is reported in HM Treasury (2017). 
2 To count, a participant had to have at least 95 percent of her assets in the TDF. 
3 Sponsored and reported by Condor Capital, this ongoing study is being conducted by Backend 
Benchmarking.  Not that some prominent firms were not included in this study, most notably 
Financial Engines, which is one of the oldest and most successful robo-advisors. 
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Figure 10.1. Customization and complexity in the advice space 
Note: Currently, robo-advice offerings largely focus on asset allocation, fund selection and 
 rebalancing  
Source: Author’s analysis. 
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Figure 10.2. Digitization of advice generation and delivery 
Source: Authors' analysis 
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Figure 10.3. Taxable Account Portfolio and Asset Returns (%) for 20 Robo Advisors "Moderate 
Risk" Investor              
 
Source: Condor Capital (2018). 
 
Note: Condor Capital and Backend Benchmarking report that they established accounts at 20 
robo-advisors, 7 at the beginning of 2016 and an additional 14 at the beginning of 2017.   
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Figure 10.4. Taxable account annualized risk/return statistics for seven robo-advisors with two 
years of returns (as of the end of 2017) 
Source: Condor Capital (2018). 
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Figure 10.5. Upside/downside capture ratio for seven robo-advice providers with two years of 
returns (as of the end of 2017) 
Source: Condor Capital (2018). 
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Table 10.1. Types of robo-advice and firms in the US 
marketplace   
 
    
Type Description Level of Discretion Clients Examples 
Guidance Portfolio assessment which 
determines a recommended 
allocation  
Nondiscretionary, 
nonadvisory 
All clients E*Trade's 
Online Advisor 
Financial 
planning 
One time full review of 
portfolios which determines 
potential to meet financial 
goals. Makes 
recommendations on savings 
rates, withdrawal rates, 
optimized allocation, and 
investments for meeting 
goals. 
Nondiscretionary, 
advisory 
Complimentary 
for clients 
meeting asset 
threshold. 
Available for fee 
to other clients 
Vanguard's 
financial 
planning group  
Managed 
accounts 
Provider determines 
appropriate allocation and 
investments and provides 
ongoing portfolio 
management. 
Usually 
discretionary, 
advisory 
Clients pay asset-
based fee. 
Account 
minimums vary, 
start as low as 
$20K. 
Fidelity's 
Portfolio 
Advisory 
Service® 
Private 
client 
Provider determines 
appropriate allocation and 
investments and provides 
ongoing portfolio 
management. Client receives 
other services as necessary 
such as tax, estate, and 
financial planning. 
Discretionary, 
advisory 
Clients pay an 
asset-based fee, 
minimums 
usually around 
$500K. 
Schwab's 
Private Client 
RIA 
referral 
Provider refers a client 
seeking advice to an local 
RIA who custodies assets 
with the direct provider. 
N/A Clients with 
more complex 
financial needs 
TD 
Ameritrades' 
AdvisorDirect™ 
 
    
Source : Analysis based on authors' survey of advisor 
offerings.   
 
    
Note: RIA refers to Registered Investment Advisor.   
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Table 10.2. Taxable account fees and investment minimums for 20 robo-advisors 
 
Advisor Fees Account Minimums  
Acorns $1/mo <$5K; 25 bps/yr >$5K None 
Ally Financial 30 bps/yr $2,500  
Betterment 
25 bps/yr digital only; 40 bps "Plus" (unlimited chat, 1 
call/yr w/advisor); 50 bps "Premium" (unlimited calls 
and chat); no fee if assets >$2M 
None digital only; $100K 
"Plus" and "Premium" 
Ellevest 25 bps digital only; 50 bps "Premium" (access to live advisor) 
None digital only; $50K 
premium 
E*Trade (ETFs) 30 bps/yr $5,000  
Fidelity Go 35 bps/yr $5,000  
FutureAdvisor 50 bps/yr $10,000  
Hedgeable 75 bps/yr <$50K; decreasing to 30 bps/yr to $1M and above None 
Merrill Edge 45 bps/yr $5,000  
Personal Capital 89 bps/yr <$1M; decreasing above $1M $100,000  
Schwab No fee digital only; 28 bps/yr for access to live advisor $5,000  
SigFig No fee <$10K; 25 bps/yr >$10K $2,000  
SoFi No fee <$10K; 25 bps/yr >$10K; no fee if client has a SoFi loan $100  
TD Ameritrade 30 bps/yr "Essential"; higher fee tiering depending on 
asset size and portfolio "Selective" 
$5,000 "Essential"; 
$25,000 "Selective" 
TIAA 30 bps/yr $5,000  
Vanguard 30 bps yr <$5M; decreasing above $5M $50,000  
WealthFront No fee <$10K; 25 bps/yr >$10K $500  
WealthSimple 50 bps/yr <$100K; 40 bps/yr >$100K None 
WiseBanyan No fee None 
Zack's Advantage 50 bps/yr <$100K; 35 bps/yr >$100K $5,000  
   
Source: Derived from Condor Capital (2018)  
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Table 10.3. Taxable account asset allocations and equity splits for 20 robo-advisors 
 
 Allocation % Equity Split % 
  2017 2018 2017 2018 
Advisor Equities Fixed Income Misc Cash Equities 
Fixed 
Income Misc Cash Domestic International Domestic  International 
Acorns 62 38 0 0 62 38 0 0 84 16 75 25 
Ally Financial 59 38 2 1 61 37 0 3 69 31 59 41 
Betterment 65 35 0 0 65 35 0 0 49 51 49 51 
Ellevest 62 36 0 2 56 41 0 2 71 29 63 73 
E*Trade (ETFs) 60 39 0 1 61 36 0 2 75 25 76 24 
Fidelity Go 61 39 0 0 60 40 0 1 71 29 70 30 
FutureAdvisor 59 41 0 0 59 39 0 1 49 51 45 55 
Hedgeable 56 34 8 2 59 32 8 2 79 21 79 21 
Merrill Edge 60 39 0 1 60 36 0 4 66 34 64 36 
Personal Capital 68 25 5 2 71 24 4 11 70 30 69 31 
Schwab 62 23 5 10 64 22 4 11 51 49 51 49 
SigFig 61 37 0 2 63 35 0 2 59 41 60 40 
SoFi 60 40 0 0 60 40 0 0 67 33 66 34 
TD Ameritrade 65 33 0 2 71 28 0 2 65 35 60 40 
TIAA 61 37 0 3 62 36 0 2 61 29 71 29 
Vanguard 59 41 0 0 62 38 0 0 61 29 60 40 
WealthFront 58 41 0 1 63 35 0 2 69 31 70 30 
WealthSimple 62 38 0 0 62 38 0 0 66 34 66 34 
WiseBanyan 65 35 0 0 65 35 0 0 62 38 63 37 
Zack's 
Advantage 58 32 0 9 58 32 0 9 72 38 72 28 
             
Source: Derived from Condor Capital (2018)          
